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SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN
TRANSNATIONAL SECURITIES FRAUD CASES
In recent years there has been a great increase in the number of
securities transactions involving persons or events linked with foreign
countries and the United States) In the aftermath of some of these
transnational transactions, various participants have often claimed that
fraudulent practices occurred in the course of the transaction. When
the allegedly defrauded party has attempted to bring suit under the
antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts, 2 the federal courts have
been faced at the outset with difficult questions regarding subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. There is no expression of congressional intent as to
the reach of these provisions over transactions involving foreign
elements. 3
 Therefore, the issue of jurisdiction has turned largely on
the court's understanding of the policies behind the Acts and of the
considerations of international law. 4
 Two recent Second Circuit cases,
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. 5 and IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.° have provided
the most definitive statement in this area to date and present an im-
portant step in the evolving solution to this difficult issue.
In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., plaintiff, an American pur-
chaser of the common stock of' Investors Overseas Services, Ltd.
(I0S), brought an action individually and on behalf of a class' of all
persons who purchased common stock through three interrelated of-
ferings by 10S.H The defendants were an international accounting
firm, various American and foreign financial institutions, and an in-
ternational financial service organization and its chief officer. 9 The
' See Comment, The Transnational Reach of Rule 10b-5, 121 U. PENN. L. Rev. 1363,
1364 (1974).
2 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), § 78j (1970).
3 See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone. Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), ter& denied, 96
S. Ct. 453 (1975).
4 Sue, e.g., IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016.18 (2d Cir. 1975); Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334-39 (2d Cir. 1972).
° 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 453 (1975).
° 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
The plaintiff class numbered no more than 25,000. Allegedly, 386 of this
number were American. 519 F.2d at 977-78 n.2.
°!d. at 981. The district court found that the three offerings were "sufficiently
integrated and intertwined" to be considered as one for the purposes of subject matter
jurisdiction. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Stipp. 446, 451-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
The primary offering was intended to create a market so as to enable IOS management
personnel to dispose of their own IOS stock in the secondary offering. The district
court found this aspect to be a "relatedness of purpose." Id. at 453. The circuit court
did not resolve this point but left for remand the determination of whether the primary
offering could be considered "essential to the carrying out" of the secondary offering.
519 F.2d at 991-92 n.41.
9
 In particular, the defendants were LOS, an international sales and financial ser-
vice organization formed under the laws of Canada and having a principal place of
business in Geneva, Switzerland, 519 F.2d at 978; its chief officer and stockholder, Ber-
nard Cornfeld, 389 F. Supp. at 449; two American banking houses; one foreign bank;
five foreign underwriters; and an international accounting firm, 519 F.2d at 978-80.
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plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the securities laws by
failing to reveal material facts in the prospectus, pursuant to which
the offering was made, concerning 10S's poor financial position, il-
legal activities, chaotic bookkeeping and mismanagement, and actual
looting and plundering of its treasury.'°
The offerings were prepared, in part, in the United States. They
were discussed and partially initiated and organized in this country
during numerous - meetings and telephone conversations between the
major underwriters, their American attorneys, and IOS officials and
accountants." A portion of the basic prospectus was also prepared in
the United States." Finally, a draft of this prospectus was circulated
in the United States among prospective underwriters." The three of-
ferings were issued from abroad, but each contained substantially
identical prospectuses based on the United States draft." Each pro-
spectus disclaimed sales to Americans except IOS employees, as-
sociates, and certain clients.' 5 Although the offerings were fully sub-
scribed, the stock soon became worthless."
The named plaintiff, Howard Bersch, a United States citizen liv-
ing in New York. purchased 600 shares of IOS in one of the
offerings," apparently in reliance on the prospectus." Although the
exact circumstances of the sale are unclear, a foreign office of IOS
apparently mailed a subscription form to Bersch in New York because
he was an officer of a company doing substantial business with 10S."
The circumstances of sales to other American residents are equally
unclear. However, it was shown that there were sales to at least 22
Americans who had had some business relationship with IOS. Based
on these American sales, the court assumed that prospectuses must
have been mailed into the United States to these people. 2 °
The primary issue before the court was whether it has subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the suit. The district court concluded that
it did have subject matter jurisdiction with regard to the entire
action." The court based its decision on (1) the significance of the
defendant's activity in the United States, (2) the impact of the stock
offering upon the American purchasers and (3) the general adverse
'" 389 F. Supp. at 449.
"Id. at 455-57.
' 2 1d. at 456.
"Id. at 457.
' 4
 519 F.2d at 980.
" Id.
"Id. at 981. The stock was sold for $10 per share, rose to a high of $14, and de-
clined swiftly thereafter.
" Id. at 981.
" Id. at 990-91.
" See id. at 980, 990. Plaintiff Bersch stated that his office in New York had
copies of all three prospectuses, but he was not sure how he came to receive them.
"Id, at 991. The court also stated that it would assume that there was reliance
on the prospectuses, though this fact could be disproved upon remand. Id.
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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effects upon the American securities market resulting from the col-
lapse in the price of the IOS stock offered. 22
On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction as to
the resident American plaintiffs, based on the direct effect which the
fraudulent prospectus had upon purchasers who relied on it, 23
 and as
to non-resident American plaintiffs, based on preparatory activities"
of the defendants which took place in the United States and which
"significantly contributed" to the plaintiffs' losses." However, the suit
as to foreign plaintiffs outside the United States was dismissed since
there was no activity of the defendants within the United States which
directly caused their losses."
In the companion case to Bersch, IIT v. Vencap, Ltd," plaintiff
liquidators of IIT, an international investment trust organized under
the laws of Luxembourgh, brought an action against Vencap, a
Bahamian venture capital firm; its president Pistell, an American re-
siding in the Bahamas; and Vencap's American legal representatives."
IIT had approximately 150,000 fundholders of whom about 300 were
Americans." The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws by failing to reveal material
facts in a memorandum pursuant to which IIT purchased from Ven-
cap three million dollars of Vencap's preferred securities. 30 Plaintiffs
also alleged that the defendants subsequently misappropriated the
proceeds of the sale of the securities. 3 '
Pistell organized Vencap in 1972. Shortly thereafter, he met in
London with Graze, the American president of the English corpora-
tion which managed HT. They orally agreed that HT would invest in
Vencap." A three page memorandum was prepared in Nassau by
Vencap's lawyers detailing the purposes of Vencap and the specifics
of the transaction. 33
 The final agreement for the purchase by IIT of
42 1d. at 457-58.
23
 519 F.2d at 991, 993. On remand, defendants would be able to overturn this
ruling if they proved that the resident Americans did not rely on the prospectus . in
making their purchase. Id. at 991.
" Id. at 992. The court interchanges terms somewhat, stating first that "pre-
paratory" activities would be enough, id. at 992, and then stating that acts "of material
importance" must occur in the United States. Id., at 993.
25 Id. at 992-93. These activities are detailed in text at notes 9-11 supra.
"Id. at 993, 997. This result is implicit in the court's holding. See id. at 993.
However, problems of maintaining a large class action with a preponderance of foreign
members were also determinative of this result. Id. at 997-98.
" 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
"Id. at 1003, 1005.
25 Id. at 1016 n.28.
" ld. at 1011-12.
"Id. at 1013-14.
32 Id. at 1004-05.
33 Id. at 1005-07. See id. at 1021-24, Appendix A for full text of memorandum.
415
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
three million dollars in Vencap's preferred securities34 was drafted in
New York by IIT's lawyers and thereafter exchanged in New York
with Vencap's lawyers. 35
 The sale was closed in the Bahamas. 36 Pistell
subsequently caused Vencap to enter into several questionable transac-
tions involving dispositions of Vencap funds which the plaintiffs al-
leged were inconsistent with the operation of a bona fide venture capi-
tal firm and which may also have been injurious to shareholder
interests."
Once again the issue before the court was whether subject mat-
ter jurisdiction existed to hear the suit. The district court held that it
had subject matter jurisdiction over the alleged violations since, inter
alia, (1) the defendants prepared much of the final agreement in the
United States 36 and (2) the plaintiff trust had United States citizens
and residents as fundholders."
On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the district court on both grounds. 40 It held that the
31 This agreement made Vencap highly leveraged. See id. at 1012. 5,000 common
shares of Vencap were originally authorized. Blocks of 2,000 shares each at $1 per
share were issued to Pistell and De Reincourt, a French investor who served as a straw
man in the Vencap organization. Id. at 1005. !IT paid three million dollars, which
equalled 99.9% of Vencap's total capital. IIT received 30,000 perferred shares redeem-
able at $100 each..IIT received no voting rights and thus no representation on the
Board of Directors. IIT was to receive a 6% annual dividend and a one third profit dis-
tribution, but only if these were declared by the Board. Id. at 1021-24. Since the shares
were redeemable at par value plus accrued dividends, and since the dividends and prof-
it rights were non-cumulative, it would be to Pistell's benefit not to declare dividends or
profit distribution and to redeem the shares when accumulated earnings caused the
value of the stock to exceed par.
It was these notorious aspects of the deal which influenced the plaintiffs to pro-
ceed in the district court on the theory that the sale was a result of a conspiracy be-
tween IIT's management and Pistell to defraud the IIT fundholders. The district court
found that this theory was not supported by sufficient evidence and could not therefore
serve as the basis for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See id. at 1012-13. The
plaintiffs did not pursue this theory in the circuit court.
" Id. at 1006. However, Charles Murphy, Vencap's lawyer, drafted the stock re-
demption provisions of the agreement in New York. Id.
36 Id. at 1007.
37 Id. at 1008-09, 1013-14. By an involved and circuitous process, Pistell used a
"loan" of $590,000 from Vencap to pay his federal and state taxes, several personal
loans, and to satisfy a judgment against him. Id. at 1009. The loan was routed to Pistell
through a Swiss bank and a Netherlands Antilles corporation (whose chief shareholders
were Pistell and a colleague) which held no assets. Id. at 1008. Although Vencap did get
7% interest from the Swiss bank, id. at 1009, the loan was hardly the "sophisticated in-
vestment" producing the "high return" which the Vencap memorandum promised.
See id. at 1021-22, Appendix A. Also, Vencap funds were used to grant a $155,000 loan
to Chibex, a Canadian gold mine corporation controlled by Conservative Capital, Ltd.,
which was controlled by Pistell and an associate. Id. at 1010. Plaintiffs claimed that
$672,000 more of Vencap's funds were invested in the Lincoln American Corporation
of which Pistell was chairman of the executive committee and whose stock was traded
on the American Stock Exchange. Id. n.16.
3g
 See text at note 35 supra.
" See id. at 1016.
"M. at 1011-12, 1016-17.
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memorandum was not fraudulent; therefore, the defendants' activities
in the United States regarding the memorandum are not significant
for jurisdictional purposes.'" The court also held that the fact that
300 Americans were fundholders of 11T is not a sufficient basis for
finding subject matter jurisdiction since the effect of the sale upon the
Americans as a group was both indirect and insubstantial in compari-
son to the effect upon the foreign fundholders of IIT. 42
 The court
then offered guidance to the plaintiffs as to alternative theories of
fraud upon which subject matter jurisdiction could be more easily
based.43
 It remanded the case for further findings as to the factual
basis supporting such alternative theories." Significantly, the court
stated that if the foreign plaintiff trust could establish that the defen-
dants actually perpetrated fraudulent acts within the United States,
then subject matter jurisdiction would exist despite the foreign na-
tionality of the plaintiffs. 45
It is seldom clear whether a federal court. has subject matter
jurisdiction over a complex transnational transaction. Many factors af-
fect the decision regarding jurisdiction and it is the purpose of this
comment to discuss those factors. First, the jurisdictional framework
within which the federal courts make the decision as to whether they
have subject matter jurisdiction over a transnational securities fraud
case will be reviewed. Then an examination will be made of the two
bases on which the jurisdictional issue is ultimately determined:
defendant's activity within the United States, and the effects within
the United States of defendant's foreign activity. Throughout, a
thorough analysis of Bersch and HT will be undertaken. It will ulti-
mately be submitted that Bersch and IIT are the two most significant
cases in this area of transnational securities fraud, having by their re-
finements greatly elucidated the complex issue of the international
reach of the American securities laws.
I. JURISDICTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 46 the general
jurisdictional section of the Act, provides in broad terms that the fed-
eral courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of "violations" of the Act.'"
41 1d. at 1011-12, 1018.
"Id. at 1016-17.
43 /d. at 1012-14, 1018.
44 1d. at 1018-19.
"Id, at 1017-18.
4° 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
"Id, Section 27 provides in pertinent part:
The district courts of the United States ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and
of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or
duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder. Any
criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act or
transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any suit or action to en-
force any liability or duty created by this chapter ... may be brought in
417
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The "violations" referred to in section 2, which are the subject of this
comment are violations of the antifraud sections of the Securities Act
of 1933" and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." These violations
often involve application of SEC Rule 10b-5 5 ° which provides, insofar
as is relevant to jurisdictional bases, that the plaintiff must prove some
use of the mails or of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce."
The antifraud sections of the Securities Acts contain similar
language. 52
 This reference to the use of interstate commerce and the
mails was inserted for the purpose of invoking Congress' power to
legislate under the Commerce Clause." It was not intended to be the
basis for subject matter jurisdiction."
any such district or in the district wherein he defendant is found or is an
inhabitant or transacts business ....
Section 22(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1970), contains similar
language and its scope is construed to be the same as that of section 27. See, e.g., Bersch
v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Interpreting section 27 of the 1934 Act requires an initial distinction between
venue language and general subject matter jurildiction language. While some courts
have looked to language regarding where the act i on "may be brought" as pertaining to
subject matter jurisdiction, see, e.g., Finch v. Marathon Sec. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1345,
1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), it seems that this language was intended to refer to venue. See,
e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.), reed on other grounds, 405
F.2d 215 (1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), where the court emphasized
the language regarding exclusive jurisdiction of "violations" in discussing subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 206. The requirement that the defendant be "found" in the district
where the action is brought is an easy one to me ' t and would not be - sufficient to assert
subject matter jurisdiction. See text at notes 93-1 4 infra. Where the defendant may be
"found" or where he transacts business are traditionally venue considerations. See 28
U.S.C. § 1391 (1970). Thus, the parallel language regarding the bringing of criminal
proceedings in districts where an "act or transaction constituting the violation occurred"
could more consistently be interpreted as allowing venue in districts where the use of
the facilities of interstate commerce is shown, since such use is a necessary element in
the proof of a Securities Act antifraud violation. 17 C.F.R. 240.101)-5 (1975). The anti-
fraud provisions as well as Rule 10b-5 make it a violation to use the facilities of inter-
state commerce to commit fraud. See i 5 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j (1970).
43
 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
45 1d. § 78j (1970).
5° 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1975). This provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange!
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order tii make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceitlupon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale or any security.
51 Id. Note that "interstate commerce" is defined in the statute as including com-
merce "between any foreign country and any state." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (1970).
" See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j (1970).
53 United States v. Robertson, 181 F. Supp. 158, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
54 See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333 (2d
Cir. 1972). See text at notes 93-94 infra.
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Section 27 does not expressly grant jurisdiction over transna-
tional cases. 55 Further, it seems clear that in the days following the
Great Depression, when Section 27 was enacted, Congress did not
even consider the problem of transnational securities fraud." On the
other hand, section 27 does not contain any limitations which pre-
clude jurisdiction over transnational cases." Since the Securities Acts
define "interstate commerce" as including commerce "between any
foreign country and any state," 55 extension of federal court jurisdic-
tion into the transnational area would seem to be within the purview
of the Acts." However, since the jurisdictional language of section 27
is so vague, federal courts have been forced to consider factors exter-
nal to the provision to decide the jurisdictional issue presented in
transnational cases. Among these factors are principles of statutory
construction and international law, remedial goals which the Securities
Acts were designed to effectuate, and policy considerations in the area
of conflicts of law.
To avoid conflict with international law, federal courts have
created a presumption that federal statutes do not apply to activity
which transpired outside the United States." However, federal courts
will not construe federal statutes in a manner contrary to the legisla-
tive intent." Thus, the presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion is rebutted when the requisite Congressional intent appears in the
legislative history." Since Congress did not specifically address the
question of the extraterritorial applicability of the antifraud provi-
sions of the securities laws," federal courts have attempted to divine
the legislative intent by speculating in each fact situation what Con-
55 See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
55 See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993.
"See 15 U.S.C. 78aa (1970).
55 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l7) (1970).
55 See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 209-10 (2d Cir.), reu'd on other
grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (1968) (en banc), cert, denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
" See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-57
(1909).	 •
" See, e.g., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1940). Courts will also look
to analogous statutory provisions and overall legislative policy to determine legislative
intent.
" Id, at 285; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932). Moreover, if
the legislative command is clear, federal courts will apparently give extraterritorial ef-
fect to the American statute even if such an effect violates international law. United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945); accord, Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
es 519 F.2d at 993. The legislative history of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. 1 78j (1970) does not consider this issue. See generally 78 CoNG. REC. 7701-06,
7861-69, 7920-29, 8295-8301 (1934). Congress did, however, consider the question of
subject matter jurisdiction over transnational securities transactions in the limited area
of securities transactions conducted over foreign securities exchanges. Thus, in section
30(b) of the 1994 Act, 15 U.S.C. 78dd(b) (1970), Congress provided that:
The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder
shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities
without the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business
419
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gress would have done had it thought about the problem." The result
has been a strong judicial desire to effectuate the remedial purposes
of the Securities Acts" by broadly asserting jurisdiction under the
Acts while still remaining within the limits of international law."
Thus, a starting point for analyzing the scope of the antifraud provi-
sions in the transnational setting is to understand the applicable inter-
national taw principles.
International law gives wide latitude to a country's power to pre-
scribe rules of jurisdiction (prescriptive jurisdiction) over conduct oc-
curring within its borders. The doctrine underlying this power is
called the "subjective territorial principle." 67
 This principle requires
only the occurrence of some activity within the country which relates
to some national interest: 6° the activity need not produce an effect
in contravention of such rules and regulatilans as the commission may pre-
scribe to prevent the evasion of this chapter.
(Emphasis added). The SEC has not promulgated any rules or regulations under this
section. The purpose of' this section is to allow prjfessionals in the securities business to
conduct transactions outside the United Stateswithout complying with the Act's bur-
densome regulatory provisions. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 207 (2d Cir.),
rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
Thus, dealers, brokers, and banks, though probably not investment companies, see Roth
v. Fund of Funds, 405 F.2d 421, 422 (2d Cir. IT) (dictum), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975
(1969), can invoke this section. Schoenbaum v. irstbrook, supra at 207. Further, this
provision is limited to professionals who regularly transact their business abroad, and
not to persons who engage in isolated foreign transactions. Id.
The key words in the provision are "without the jurisdiction of the United
States." The courts. have interpreted jurisdiction"' in section 30(b) to mean subject mat-
ter or prescriptive jurisdiction, rather than territorial 'jurisdiction." Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); SEC v. United Fin. Group, Inc.,
474 F.2d. 354, 357-58 (9th Cir. 1973). Bench would define the jurisdiction' referred to
1in section 30(b) as coextensive with normal subject matter jurisdiction. 389 F. Supp. at
459. Two cases where section 30(b) was cited to dismiss a claim under the Securities
Acts arc Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen er & Smith, Inc., 48 F.R.D. 385, 386
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) and Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). In each
case it would appear that there would have been t o subject matter jurisdiction even ab-
sent section 30(b). See Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., supra
at 386; Kook v. Crang, supra at 390. The sectionihus seems little more than a conven-
ient ground for dismissing cases in which subject Matter jurisdiction was otherwise lack-
ing.
"See, e.g., IIT, 519 F.2d at 1016-17; Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985, 993; Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 132f, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
" See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.20 200, 206 (2d Cir.), rev'd an other
grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (1968) (en banc), cert. denik, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); 15 U.S.C. §
78b (1970) and text accompanying notes 80-83 infra..
66
 See, e.g., Bench, 519 F.2d at 985, 991. Oflourse, courts must still construe stat-
utes within the limits of the Constitution. In this context, the legislative intent will, if
necessary, be ignored. Thus, Fifth Amendment Due Process protection is available to
limit jurisdiction. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Ctrp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334
(2d Cir. 1972); cf. International Shoe Co. v. Wash ngton, 326 U.S. 310 (1940), showing
the influence of due process in the in personam jurisdiction area.
67 See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F Supp. 446, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
66
 RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
17 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)] states:
Jurisdiction to Prescribe with Respect to Conduct, Thing, Status, or
Other Interest Within Territory
420
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within the country." The Second Circuit has indicated that under the
Securities Acts, the international law requirements are satisfied by
proof of the use of the mails or facilities of interstate commerce
within the United States. 7° Since proof of such use is always a neces-
sary part of any antifraud claim,"' the assertion of subject matter
jurisdiction in such transnational cases based on defendant's activity
within the United States will not violate international law. 72
International law also accords broad power to a State to pre-
scribe rules with respect to the conduct of its own nationals. The doc-
trine which gives rise to this power is called the "nationality
principle."'" Under this principle, a State can assert subject matter
jurisdiction over any act of one of its nationals even if the act oc-
curred outside the State and had no impact within the State." Al-
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences , to conduct that occurs within its
territory, whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects
of the conduct outside the territory, and
(h) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized,
in its territory.
While the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) is not the final word on international law, federal
courts have adopted it as the international law standard. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 68, at § 17(a). Thus, where X in State A
shoots across the border into State B killing Y. State A has jurisdiction even though the
effect occurred in State B. See id., comment a at 95.
" See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1335 (2d
Cir. 1972) (dictum). For a discussion on this point, see Comment, The Transnational
Reach of Rule 10b-5, 121 U. PENN. L. REV. 1363, 1373-74 (1973). It is suggested that § 17
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), .supra note should not be read so broadly. The lan-
guage that a State has prescriptive jurisdiction to attach "legal consequences to conduct
that occurs within its territory," id., could be read to preclude jurisdiction over chal-
lenged activity that occurred without the State. Thus where the substance of the fraud
occurs outside the State and only the use of interstate commerce facilities occurs within
the State, international law might bar application of that State's law to the fraud itself.
This argument is merely academic where federal courts have already chosen to follow
such an approach in the subject matter jurisdiction area, see Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985, and
to ignore as detertninative of subject matter jurisdiction the mere use of interstate
commerce. See text at notes 93-94 infra. However, any extension by the federal courts
of subject matter jurisdiction principles under § 17 which would approach the minimal
prescriptive jurisdiction limits (use of interstate commerce) might violate § 17 under the
more restrictive interpretation suggested above.
" See note 47 supra..
" However, note that the federal courts have required proof of more activity
than the jurisdictional minimum. See text at notes 93-94 infra.
"See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 455 n.8 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND), note 68 supra, § 30. This section provides in pertinent
Jurisdiction to Prescribe with Respect to Nationals
(1) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct of a national of the state
wherever the conduct occurs or
(b) as to the status of a national or as to an interest of a national,
wherever the thing or other subject matter to which the interest relates is
located
part;
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though application of the "nationality principle" has often been urged
in cases where American defendants have defrauded plaintiffs
abroad, the federal courts have rejected such an application, finding
an insufficiency of American interests in comparison to potential in-
ternational conflicts."
Finally, international law recognizes the right of a State to pre-
scribe rules over conduct which occurs outside the State but which
produces an effect within the State." This doctrine is called the "ob-
jective territorial principle." 77 The effect must be "substantial" and
must occur as a "direct and foreseeable result" of the extraterritorial
conduct. 78 Under this principle, a federal court would have subject
matter jurisdiction over a violation of the securities laws which oc-
curred in a foreign country but which had effects in the United
States. As a practical matter, however, difficulties arise in the applica-
tion of this principle to establish jurisdiction. These difficulties, which
will be discussed later," significantly limit the principle's utility.
Other factors, external to section 27, which the federal courts
consider in deciding the jurisdictional issue are the purposes which
Congress sought to effectuate in enacting the Securities Acts. In gen-
eral, federal courts will apply the Securities Acts broadly to promote
the remedial purposes behind them. 8° Among those purposes are (1)
the protection of American investors, 81 (2) the maintenance of fair
and honest domestic markets in securities transactions, 82 and (3) the
73
 See, e.g., IIT, 519 F.2d at 1016.
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), Supra note 68, § 18, provides:
Jurisdiction to Prescribe with Respect to Effect within Territory
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect
within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent
elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably
developed legal systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity
to which the rule applies;
(ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct out-
side the territory; and
(iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice gener-
ally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
" Bench v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), Mipra note 68, §§ 18(b) (ii), (iii).
79 See text at note 223 infra.
°° See, e.g., Supt. of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Gas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10, 12 (1971).
81 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
405 F.2d 215 (1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
'a 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970) provides in pertinent part:
[t]ransactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities ex-
changes and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public
interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of
such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto ... to insure
the maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions.
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prevention of manipulation of the prices of securities." Where the
transnational plaintiff can demonstrate that the finding of subject
matter jurisdiction in his case is necessary to further any of these
purposes of the Acts, his case is strengthened considerably."
Moreover, it appears that Congress' purpose in prohibiting
fraudulent practices was especially broad. The antifraud provisions
seek to protect both purchasers and sellers of securities." The lan-
guage of section 10(b) and its legislative history make it clear that such
protection is not limited to transactions conducted over the national
exchanges but is afforded to any securities transaction." Application
of the antifraud provisions to all securities transactions strongly sug-
gests a remedial purpose even broader in scope for the antifraud area
of the securities laws than for other areas."
Jurisprudential considerations may, however, exert a conserva-
tive influence on the courts' decisions regarding subject matter juris-
diction. Arguably, the "precious resources of United States courts and
law enforcement agencies" should not be devoted to regulating essen-
tially foreign transactions. 88 Also, the refusal of a foreign court to give
res judicata effect to an American judgment might unfairly subject a
defendant to double liability, or at least force him to defend the same
action a second time against the same plaintiff. 69 On the other hand,
an American plaintiff should not be forced to litigate his claim over-
seas, especially in a country which might not police fraud as strictly as
the United States does under Rule 10b-5. In such a situation, a fed-
eral court may have the obligation to provide a forum at least for
" 15 U.S.C. 4 78b(S) (1970).
44 See, e.g., Investment Properties Intl, Ltd. v. LO.S., Ltd., [1970-71 Transfer
Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,011, at 90.735 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion (2d
Cir. 1971) (unreported), where Judge Frankel, dismissing a Securities Act suit against
IOS for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stated that where a foreign transaction has
no impact upon domestic interest, federal courts "have no reason to become involved,
and compelling reason not to become involved, in the burdens of enforcement and the
delicate problems of foreign relations and international economic policy that extrater-
ritorial application may entail."
45 Protection does not extend, however, beyond purchasers and sellers. Blue Chip
Stamps v. Mam.n. Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
" 15 U.S.C. 44 77q(a) and 78j (1970). See discussion in Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336 (2d Cir. 1972). Of course, protection can
only be afforded to those transactions over which the courts have jurisdiction.
" See, e.g., SEC Release No. 33-4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828 (1964) exempting from
the registration requirements of the 1933 Act certain offers and sales to foreign nation-
als living abroad, notwithstanding the use of the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce in connection with such offers and sales. On the other hand, the SEC has consis-
tently urged application of the antifraud provisions in such situations. Brief of SEC as
Arnkus Curiae on Petition for Rehearing 4-6, LIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.
1975).
" Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985.
" Id. at 996-97.
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American based claims.90 Abstention in such cases might create "gaps
in international regulation through which a modern-day pirate may
safely sail."9 ' Perhaps none of these considerations alone will deter-
mine subject matter jurisdiction in a clear case; however, their ab-
sence or presence can become crucial in a close case.
In sum, the resolution of the jurisdictional issue in transnational
cases involves a subtle accommodation of many different factors, no
one of which seems critical by itself. The statutory jurisdictional sec-
tions of the Securities Acts afford little assistance in determining the
issue. International law principles provide an end point near which
federal courts have refused to tread. The outcome has been that the
courts have applied the Securities Acts broadly by taking jurisdiction
where interests sought to be protected by the Acts are at stake.
Nonetheless, countervailing conflicts of laws policy considerations may
influence this result critically where considerations of comity are
involved. 92
II. BASES FOR SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Based on Domestic Activity
The antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts require a use of
domestic interstate commerce facilities before they can be properly
invoked." However, in most cases the minimal activity necessary to
satisfy this requirement will not be enough to support subject matter
jurisdiction in the federal courts where the remainder of the allegedly
fraudulent transaction took place in a foreign country." Thus, the
central question under the activities approach is precisely what type of
activities must be shown to establish subject matter jurisdiction."
" See discussion in Mizrack, Recent Developments in the Extraterritorial Application of
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 30 Bus, LAWYER 367, 385-86
(1975).
" Brief of SEC as ilmicus Curiae on Petition for Rehearing 10, I1T v. Vencap,
Ltd., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
ea
	 e.g„ Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 996-97 (2d Cir. 1975);
Investment Properties Intl, Ltd. v. 1.0.S., Ltd., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
Sec. L. ReP.11 93,011, at 90.735 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without opinion, (2d Cir. 1971) (unre-
ported).
sa 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970); see Hooper v. Mountain States
Sec. Corp. 282 F.2d 195, 204 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
" See Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Stipp. 388, 390-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Where activities
sufficient to meet the interstate commerce requirement of the antifraud provisions are
shown but are insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction, the federal courts must
base a finding of subject matter jurisdiction on the domestic effects of the fraudulent
transaction. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 403 F.2d 200, 206-09 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
1"° This comment will not deal with factual problems involved in determining
where a particular act took place. Such problems are largely a matter for the fact-
finder. An interesting question is raised, however, by the facts of Ferraioli v. Cantor,
259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), where the fraud involved a failure to disclose rather
than an active misrepresentation. Id. at 845. The defendant, residing in Canada, was
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First, the activities must relate to the allegedly fraudulent trans-
actions sued upon. In Kook v. Crang," the district court dismissed for
want of subject matter jurisdiction an action brought by an American
stock purchaser against a Canadian brokerage house. 97 The defendant
made margin loans to the plaintiff in accordance with Canadian mar-
gin requirements, but in a manner that would have been in violation
of the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act if the Act were
held to apply to the transactions." The court held that the Exchange
Act did not apply, however, because the domestic activity upon which
the plaintiff sought to base jurisdiction, in large part merely the ac-
quisition of stock quotations from defendant's New York office, was
unrelated to the credit extensions that constituted the violation."
Thus, where the United States conduct is not connected with the acts
which constitute the violation alleged, it cannot be the basis for subject
matter jurisdiction.
In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,'" the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refined this re-
lationship as it pertains to antifraud violations. In Leasco, the Ameri-
can plaintiff purchased stock over the London Stock Exchange in re-
liance upon misrepresentations made both in New York and abroad,
by the defendants."' In holding that this domestic activity, coupled
with the effect of the misrepresentation on American investors, pro-
vided a basis for subject matter jurisdiction,'" the court stated the re-
lationship test in terms of proximate causation:'° 3 to be relevant to a
determination of jurisdiction, the domestic activity must have caused a
risk that encompassed the ultimate harm to the plaintiff.'" The court
specifically indicated that the risk created was not to be limited by a
foreseeability requirement.'" Stated, differently, the court said that
the American activity would be relevant where it was an essential link
in the fraudulent transaction alleged in the complaint.'°°
This formulation of the relationship test, by not requiring
reasonable foreseeability, provides the courts with wide discretion to
charged with a duty of notifying minority shareholderi, many of them American resi-
dents, of a sale of his stock and a subsequent transfer of control. Id. at 846. Since the
court found that control of the corporation was transferred in the United States, id., it
was not required to determine the locus of the failure to act.
"" 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
1' 7 Id. at 389, 391.
"Id, at 389, 390.
""Id. at 391.
'°° 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
'°' Id. at 1331-32. Some of the shares purchased by the plaintiff were allegedly
sold by the defendants over the exchange. Id,
1 02 1d. at 1337.
'°5
	 at 1335.
'°' Id. It is interesting to note that the court did not regard as important defen-
dants' contention that the critical misrepresentations all occurred abroad. See id. at
1334-35.
'°5 1d. at 1335.
10
°Id. , citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).
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decide whether to consider specific conduct a basis for jurisdiction.
Generally, the courts have exercised this discretion liberally and have
recognized a broad scope of activities as related to the fraud alleged.
For example, the Second Circuit in Bersch determined that prelimi-
nary meetings and discussions occurring in the United States were
relevant to the subject matter jurisdiction issue even though the essen-
tial elements of the fraudulent transaction—the misrepresentations
and sales—occurred abroad.'" Likewise, the Ninth Circuit in SEC v.
United Financial Group, Inc. 108
 held that domestic acts in preparation of
a prospectus that was to be distributed abroad were significant to a
determination of jurisdiction.'°°
A critical factor in determining whether there exists the neces-
sary relationship between specific activities and an alleged violation is
the manner in which this violation is characterized."° The significance
of proper characterization of the fraud is demonstrated in HT. In
examining the allegations of the complaint, the IIT court identified
five possible theories of the fraud, each raising somewhat different
jurisdictional problems." The first and second theories postulated
that the fraudulent acts occurred in the actual sale of the stock; the
first theory contending that the sale was fraudulent because the
memorandum describing the offer contained significant mis-
representations," 2 and the second theory because the security itself
was by its nature a "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" within
Rule 10b-5(a). 113 In both of these characterizations, the fraudulent
transaction would be regarded as completed with the execution of the
sale." 4
 Therefore, while the post-sale activities would be relevant as
evidence of a fraudulent intent on the defendant's part, they would
not be relevant to a consideration of jurisdiction." 5
Theories four and five" did not proceed on such a limited
basis. Under the fourth theory the fraudulent acts alleged were mis-
representations by Vencap that it was a bona fide venture capital firm
when, in fact, the subsequent misuse of funds indicated that it was
not." 7 The fifth theory postulated a derivative action by lIT in the
name of Vencap alleging an improper use of funds by Vencap's direc-
LOT 519 F.2d at 987, 993.
1 " 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973).
"L. Id. at 356-57.
"° See IIT, 519 F.2d at 1011-18.
" 1 1d. at 1018. In characterizing the fraud, the court did not make any conclu-
sion as to the basis for each theory in fact. Id. at 1011-14.
mid. at 1011-12.
" 3 Id. at 1012.
" 4 Id. at 1018.
"5 See id.
" 6
 The third theory, alleging a conspiracy between the managements of the
purchaser and the seller, was dealt with summarily by the court. Id. at 1012-13, 1018.
Id. at 1013.
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tors in loaning money to PisteIP" Neither of these frauds would be
completed with the sale of the preferred securities to lIT but rather
would encompass the activities occurring subsequent to the sale. Be-
cause such post-sale activities of the defendants would constitute a
consummation of the respective frauds, they must be considered as a
part of the challenged transaction." 9 As such, they would be relevant
in determining whether jurisdiction existed.'"
Once it is determined that the activities which took place in the
United States are related to the fraudulent transaction, it must be
further decided into which of the two categories defined by the Bench
and IIT courts the domestic conduct must be placed: preparatory or
substantial. Different jurisdictional consequences attach to each
category. 122
As the court in IIT noted, this distinction between preparatory
and substantial acts is often a difficult one to make.' 23 Some clues as
to the limits of each category were given in the two cases, however. In
most situations, the determinative factor in characterizing the United
States conduct as either substantial or preparatory will be the quality of
the activities that occur domestically, not merely their quantity. 124 The
court in HT indicated that activity comprising one of the central ele-
ments of the violation, for example, the misrepresentation or the sale,
would be classed as substantial.' 25 Activity in preparation for such an
elemental act, on the other hand, would be merely preparatory re-
gardless of the frequency of its occurrence.'" This distinction is made
clearer by the discussion of two different factual configurations by the
IIT court.
The court stated that, in addition to misrepresentations and sales
which are obvious elements of a fraudulent transaction, domestic ac-
tivities . that are the consummation of a Rule 10b-5 violation are ele-
mental and are to be included in the substantial category.' 27 The
court was presented with two theories of fraud which involved activity
'" Id. at 1013-14. This theory relies heavily on Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). In Bankers Life, the defendant purchasers acquired a
controlling interest in an insurance company through a sale of securities. Id. at 7-8.
They used their newly acquired corporate position to cover the purchase price with the
corporation's assets. Id. at 8. The sale itself was lawful, but the subsequent actions were
not. The court stated that the entire transaction, including the sale of securities, was
covered under Rule lOb-5 since the scheme, to succeed, necessarily included the sale of
securities. Id. at 9-12.
519 F.2d at 1018. The IIT court said that since the plaintiffs could not have
sued until the funds were misused, and the misuse was the conduct which actually
caused the loss, the misuse was part of the fraud. Id.
I" See id.
"I IIT, 519 F.2d at 1017-18; Bench, 519 F.2d at 987, 993.
"2 //r, 519 F.2d at 1017-18; Bench, 519 F.2d at 987, 993.
'" 519 F.2d at 1018.
"4 See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 987; accord, IIT, 519 F.2d at 1018.
'*5 See 519 F.2d at 1018.
"
'" Id. at 1018.
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by the defendant subsequent to the sale."8 The court stated that these
subsequent consummating acts were an essential part of the transac-
tion and therefore would be classed as substantia1. 12°
The IIT court also commented on the fact situation presented in
the Ninth Circuit case of SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc.' 30 In
United Financial Group, the defendant American corporation prepared
a prospectus used abroad in a fraudulent security transaction and
substantially supervised the transaction from this country."' The
Ninth Circuit, in noting the existence of a small degree of injury to
American investors, 132 found subject matter jurisdiction.'" In analyz-
ing these facts, the IIT court stated that the finding of a detrimental
impact to Americans was probably unnecessary to the Ninth Circuit's
result' 34 since the domestic supervision of a foreign fraud would be
sufficiently important to make it a substantial act.'"
A further question as to the substantiality of domestic conduct is
presented where elemental activity that would normally be classed as
substantial occurs both domestically and abroad. In this situation the
courts must quantitatively compare the domestic activity with the
foreign conduct.'" Such split activity was present in Leasco, but the
existence of an extensive impact on American investors in that case
made a weighing of domestic and foreign activity unimportant to the
holding.'" The Bersch court gave some indication of a test applicable
to such determinations, implying that the United States conduct will
be classed as substantial so long as it is not small in comparison to the
conduct occurring abroad. 138
Preparatory activities were found by the Bersch court when it ex-
amined the domestic activities alleged by the plaintiff in that
case—retention of counsel, meetings with the SEC, and preliminary
construction of the offerings. 139 It is noteworthy to compare this view
with that of the lower court in Bersch. In examining the same domestic
activity the district court found that this conduct was highly significant
in the fraud, noting that "substantial elements of the offering were
structured as a result of this activity.""° The court of appeals there-
"8 Id. See text at notes 116-120 supra.
"5 Id.
10
 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973).
131 Id. at 356.
135 Id.
133 1d. at 357.
14 519 F.2d at 1017.
135 Id.
16 See 519 F.2d at 987.
137 468 F.2d at 1337.
135 519 F.2d at 987.
In 519 F.2d at 985 n.24, 987. The situation was compared to the shooting of a
gun across state lines, the court saying that the Bersch acts were comparable to neither
the shooting of the gun nor the hitting of the bullet. Only the preparation of the gun
was analogous, and this would not be enough to justify jurisdiction on its own. Id. at
987.
10 Bench v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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fore seems to have taken a less functional view of the conduct. Its
characterization of the domestic activity was based on its formal posi-
tion in the transaction, rather than on its actual significance to the vio-
lation,
Thus, the Bersch and IIT decisions indicate that domestic activities
that comprise an essential element of the violation—for example, the
misrepresentation, the sale, the supervision of the fraud, or the
consummation—will be classed as substantial, while activities not meet-
ing this standard, but which are nevertheless related to the
fraud—such as meetings with counsel or government authorities—are
preparatory. The consequences which flow from the substantial pre-
paratory categorization are significant. Once a court concludes that
substantial activities have occurred in the United States, subject matter
jurisdiction is established regardless of the existence of a detrimental
domestic impact."' The IIT court noted that this country would dis-
approve of another country's permitting the export of misrepresented
securities to the United States.' 42 Therefore, Congress must have in-
tended to give courts the power to prevent similar frauds from being
based in this country for distribution elsewhere: 143 "[Me do not think
Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a base for
manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when
these are peddled only to foreigners."'" Thus a finding of substantial
domestic activity in a foreign fraud determines the question of subject
matter jurisdiction.' 45
On the other hand, when the conduct within the United States is
found to be merely preparatory to an essentially foreign transaction,
jurisdiction will vest only if the fraud produces a detrimental effect on
persons in whom the United States has an interest.'" The Bersch
court rested this conclusion on the policy of the Securities Acts in pro-
tecting American investors. 147 This type of jurisdiction, based on pre-
paratory activities coupled with a detrimental effect,'" is to be distin-
guished from jurisdiction based solely on detrimental effects in the
United Slates. Where there exists some domestic conduct that can be
classed at least as preparatory to the fraud, the courts will assume au-
thority where the effect is far more attenuated than is required in the
absence of preparatory activities.' 4" The court did this in Bersch, in
granting jurisdiction over the transactions involving American citizens
residing abroad.' 5"
"' 519 F.2d at 1017-18.
"2 1d. at 1017.
"3 Id.
14 ,11d.
'" This is at least the case where the plaintiffs are named individuals. Glass ac-
tions and derivative suits may he treated differently, however. IIT, 519 F.2d at 1018
n.31; Bench, 519 F.2d at 993-98. See note 153 infra.
''""Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993.
"T See id. at 902.
148 Id. at 993.
' 45 1d. at 992-93.
15°Id.	 429
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Other courts have also treated this effects requirement liberally
once preparatory activities are established. Sufficient domestic impact
has been found where proceeds from a foreign subsidiary's transac-
tion were funnelled into a United States corporation in order to im-
prove the parent's financial situation and to increase its attractiveness
to American investors.'" Similarly, courts have looked beyond the
party technically harmed by a transaction to an American who is the
real party in interest in order to find the requisite effect.' 52 It seems
that the courts are willing to go far to find a detrimental impact on
investors, either residents or citizens living abroad, and therefore to
find jurisdiction, so long as significant activities in preparation for the
fraudulent transaction occurred domestically.
In sum, the activities approach to subject matter jurisdiction fo-
cuses on the United States conduct that occurred in the allegedly
fraudulent transaction. If that conduct was highly significant to the
transaction, jurisdiction in the federal courts exists regardless of the
domestic impact involved. If the domestic conduct was less substantial,
but nevertheless related to the transaction, jurisdiction will vest where
the plaintiff can show resulting harm to investors in whom the United
States has an interest. This analytical framework was developed
largely by the Bersch and IIT courts. In distinguishing the two classes
of domestic activity and assigning different jurisdictional consequences
to each, Bersch and IIT provide a significant contribution to the reso-
lution of the question of subject matter jurisdiction for transnational
securities fraud.'"
151
 See United States v. Clark, 359 F. Supp. 131, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The court
stated that the fraud resulted from United States activity, but did not detail that activity.
Id.
152
 See, e.g., Lease°, 468 F.2d at. 1338; Selzer v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., 385 F.
Supp. 415, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). in Leasco, the court looked through the Netherlands
Antilles subsidiary, Leasco, N.V., which technically purchased the stock, to the parent
which had been acknowledged by the defendants during the course of the transaction
to be the real party in interest. 468 F.2d at 1338.
155 In Bersch, a further jurisdictional issue arose because of the class status of the
plaintiffs. 519 F.2d at 993. Plaintiff Bersch sought to represent all purchasers of the
LOS offering: United States residents, United States citizens resident abroad, and
foreigners. Id. at 977-78. The district court certified the class, id. at 982, but the court
of appeals reversed, excluding the foreign members. Id. at 997. The circuit court stated
that the necessity of protecting the defendant from duplicative actions required such a
result. Id. at 996-98. In class action suits where foreign members are included, the
courts should consider the potential binding effect of a judgment for the defendant, or
an inadequate plaintiffs judgment, on foreign class members who might subsequently
bring a claim in a foreign court based on the same cause of action. See id. at 996. Even
where United States conduct is substantial enough to support jurisdiction over a named
foreign plaintiff, jurisdiction should be declined as to absent foreign class members un-
less it is shown that a judgment will bind them in a foreign court. Id. at 996-97. The
Bersch court noted that such recognition of a federal court judgment by a foreign court
would be more likely if an "opt in" form of notice, whereby class members must affirm-
atively indicate their willingness to be represented in order to be included in the class,
were used.1/d. at 997 n.48. If the United States activity is of itself insufficient to support
a Rulel0b-5 claim by a foreigner, requiring that the claims of foreign class members be
based on state law and therefore cognizable in the federal courts only because of pen-
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B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Based on Domestic
Effects of Foreign Activity
The Supreme Court, in the landmark case Strassheim v. Dailey ,154
formulated the concept of domestic effects jurisdiction:'"
Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce
and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State
in punishing the cause of the harm, as if ... [the actor] had
been present at the [time of the detrimental] effect, if the
State should succeed in getting him within its power.'"
As noted earlier, principles of international law somewhat restrict the
utility of this type of jurisdiction by requiring that the effect be sub-
stantial and occur as a direct and foreseeable result of the foreign
conduct.'" However, as will be demonstrated, the federal courts do
not usually strictly apply these international law restrictions.'" In-
stead, the courts focus upon the legislative purpose of the Securities
Acts to determine whether Congress intended jurisdiction to exist
over the particular foreign transactions involved in a given case.'"
The two major questions which arise under the effects approach
in making this determination are: (1) what is the nature of the interest
which must be affected, and (2) what is the nature of the effect which
must operate on that interest. in the securities area, the interest must
be one which Congress sought to protect in enacting the Securities
dent jurisdiction, the resulting complexity of the litigation may by itself be enough to
justify the exclusion of the foreign class members. See id. at 995-96.
Similar problems with the need to protect defendants from duplicative suits arise
in derivative actions where both foreign and American shareholder interests are in-
volved. These are more difficult to resolve because the foreign interests cannot be ex-
cluded as easily as in the class action situation; therefore, the question becomes whether
to dismiss the entire suit and refuse even the Americans a forum, or litigate all in-
terests, including those of the foreign shareholders. Given the traditional reluctance of
the federal courts to force an American to bring suit in a foreign court, Burt v. Isthmus
Dev. Co., 218 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1955), the courts should hear these derivative ac-
tions when brought by an American shareholder. The court in Schoenbaum v. First-
, brook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rend on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (1968) (en bane), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), indicated, however, that under appropriate circumstances,
where the American clearly has a right of action under foreign law, a federal court may
decline jurisdiction on aforum non conveniens basis. Id. at 209 n.5..
164
 221 U.S. 280 (1913).
155
 Note that there can never be an instance of a federal court hearing a Rule
10b-5 claim where there is no activity in the United States. Proof of the use of the mails
or of some facility of interstate commerce must always be made in a Rule 10b-5 claim.
However, proof of this minimal activity—which does not rise to the level of substantial
or preparatory activity—is insufficient to establish subject matter jimisdiction. See text at
notes 93-94 supra.
155 221 U.S. at 285.
157
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TIIE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 18 (1965). See text at notes 80.85 supra.
"" See, e.g., Bench, 519 F.2d at 988, 991. See text at notes 76-78 Slip-4.
155 See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206-08 (2d Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
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Acts, such as the protection of domestic investors and the protection
of the integrity of the domestic securities market.' 6° In his message to
Congress in 1934, President Roosevelt gave his strong support for the
Securities Act bill, stating: "[T]his is but one step in our broad pur-
pose of protecting investors."'" It was this purpose that led the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook' 62 to hold
that the normal presumption against extraterritorial application of
federal legisiation' 63 is rebutted where "extraterritorial application of
the Act is necessary to protect American investors." 164
In Schoenbaum, an American stockholder in a Canadian corpora-
tion whose stock was registered on the American Stock Exchange
brought a derivative suit under Rule 10b-5 alleging fraud by the di-
rectors of the corporation in the sale of the corporation's treasury
stock. It was claimed that the price at which the stock was sold did not
reflect the value of undisclosed oil findings recently made by the
corporation.'" The court found that "Congress intended the Ex-
change Act to have extraterritorial application in order to protect
domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American
exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects
of improper foreign transactions in American securities."'" Since the
sale of the corporation's treasury stock at too low a price was deter-
mined to adversely affect both domestic investors and domestic se-
curities markets, the court held that a sufficient interest had been af-
fected and that subject matter jurisdiction thus existed to hear the
suit.'" The court did, however, restrict its holding to foreign transac-
tions involving "stock registered and listed on a national securities ex-
change [which] are detrimental to the interests of American
investors.'" "
165
	 notes 80-83 and accompanying text supra.
161 78 Conic. Rix]. 7702 (1934).
' 51 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (1968) (en Banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
' 53 See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
405 F.2d at 206. The court also held that to rebut the presumption, the trans-
actions must involve stock traded in the United States. Id. The protection of this in-
terest is discussed in text at notes 180-88 infra.
165
 405 F.2d at 204-05. There was some dispute as to whether the price was actu-
ally too low, but this was not relevant to the majority's disposition of the subject matter
jurisdiction issue. Id, at 214 (concurring opinion).
166 405 F.2d at 206 (emphasis added).
I°T Id. at 208-09.
"8 Id. Note, however, that the interest in domestic investor protection has been
sharply limited by Bersch. See text at notes 176-178 infra. It does not appear, however,
that the plaintiff must himself be within the scope of investor protection afforded by
Congress. Schoenbaum did not require that it be a domestic or American shareholder
who asserts the effect as plaintiff, but only that domestic investors' interests be affected.
See 405 F.2d at 206-08. Most cases have looked beyond the identity of the actual plain-
tiff asserting the claim to assess the total effect of the fraud. upon American interests.
See, e.g., IIT, 519 F.2d at 1016-17. Thus, in IIT, the plaintiffs were three Luxembourgh-
ian liquidators suing on behalf of IIT, a Luxembourghian trust. Id. at 1003. The court
recognized the domestic effect and did not apparently deem it fatal or even relevant
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Schoenbaum determined that activities abroad that affect the in-
terest of investor protection satisfy jurisdictional requirements.'"
However, the sufficiency for jurisdictional purposes of the interest in
investor protection may vary if the investor is not an American citizen
living at home. Where the investor is an American citizen residing
abroad, the interest in investor protection is diminished in impor-
tance, and the court may require additional proof of significant activ-
ity in the United States to support a finding of subject matter
jurisdiction."° This situation was presented in Bersch. In attempting to
prove an effect resulting from the defendants' acts, the plaintiff ar-
gued that the purchases of IOS stock by Americans residing abroad
must be considered as ,part of the domestic effect."' The court held
that Americans residing abroad are not entitled to the same protec-
tion as Americans residing at home, and that absent "preparatory" ac-
tivities by the defendant within the , United States, subject matter
jurisdiction will not be found. 12 Thus, it would appear that although
effects upon American investors abroad are cognizable for subject
matter jurisdiction purposes, they are not given the same status as ef-
fects upon American investors within the United States.
Where the investor is not an American citizen, but resides in
America, it is arguable, that the interest in investor protection is the
same as in the case of . an American citizen living at home. It would
seem that equal protection requirements, as applied to the federal
government by the Fifth Amendment,1 4 3 would require that a federal
court or the SEC treat resident alien shareholders and citizen
shareholders the same, affording both the full protection of the Se-
curities Acts.'" Moreover, the policy of the Act to provide for fair
and honest domestic markets in securities 175 would be furthered by
extending full protection to resident alien purchasers, since the denial
of such protection would create loopholes in the enforcement of Rule
10b-5 by allowing culpable defendants to escape liability merely be-
that it was non-Americans who had argued that there was an effect upon Americans.
See id. at 1016-17. It is only important, then, that there are identifiable domestic inves-
tors who have been injured by the foreign fraud.
109 405 F.2d at 208.
170 Bersch, 519 F.2d at 992-93.
'" Id.
142 Id. at 992. Specifically, the court concluded that:
Congress surely did not mean the securities laws to protect the many
thousands of Americans residing in foreign countries against securities
frauds by foreigners acting there, and we see no sufficient reason to be-
lieve it would have intended otherwise simply because an American par-
ticipated so long as he had done nothing in the United States.
173 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
1 " Classification of resident aliens is "suspect" and can only be justified by a
compelling state interest. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). See a dis-
cussion of related equal protection questions in Comment, The Transnational Reach of
Rule 10b-5, 121 U. PENN. L. Ray. 1363, 1376-78, 1386 (1973).
175 See text accompanying notes 80-83 supra.
Id.
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cause the defrauded resident-investors did not have United States citi-
zenship.
Bersch illustrated another significant characteristic of the interest
in investor protection by holding that this interest extends only to
persons who are purchasers or sellers of the securities involved in the
transaction or holders of other securities of the same issue as the se-
curities actually involved in the transaction.' 76 This limitation narrows
the holding in Schoenbaum which had seemingly provided for protec-
tion to American investors in general.'" Henceforth, the detrimental
effect cannot be claimed on behalf of American investors in
general.'"
In addition to the detrimental impact upon interests of Ameri-
can investors,"a Schoenbaum also required the foreign transactions to
"involve stock registered and listed on a national securities
exchange."'" Although it is not certain why the court considered this
element critical to its holding, an emphasis on the interest of protect-
ing the integrity of the American securities markets was implicit in the
court's opinion."' In Schoenbaum, a foreign corporation whose stock
was widely traded in America sold its treasury stock at too low a
price; 182
 as a result, other holders of that stock necessarily suffered a
diminution of the value of their stock, resulting in lower prices bid for
the stock.' 83
 It would seem that the court in Schoenbaum viewed
American interests as extending to control over such fraudulently in-
duced fluctuations in the prices of securities that are traded in the
United States. As noted earlier, this interest in the protection of
domestic markets was among the interests which the Securities Acts
were intended to protect.'"
Recent Supreme Court interpretations of Rule l013-5 188 indicate,
however, that effects jurisdiction should not be limited to situations
involving stock registered and listed on a national exchange. Section
10(b) of the Act applies to any purchase or sale of a security whether
registered on a national exchange or not.'" It is submitted that limit-
ing effects jurisdiction in such a manner would irrationally frustrate
the purposes of the Act by denying application of the Act to transac-
tions where the stock does not happen to be traded on an exchange
but where the domestic effect is significant. Foreign fraudulent prac-
"e Bench, 519 F.2d at 989. "These securities may be either the very securities
sold or bought or other securities of the same issue as in Schoenbaum." Id. n.34.
"7 See note 168 and accompanying text.
" 6
 This limitation also bears upon the nature of the effect which must operate
on the interest. See discussion in text at notes 210-22 infra.
v" See text accompanying notes 161-68 supra.
16° 405 F.2d at 208.
' 6 ' See id. at 206.
' 66 /d. at 205.
I nil at 208.
' 64 See text at note 83 supra.
' 66 Cf. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10-12
(1971). See note 118 supra.
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tices in securities. transactions will have the same domestic effect upon
American holders of other securities of the same issue, regardless of
whether those holders acquired their shares over a national exchange
or through less formal sources, such as the over-the-counter market.
Moreover, in either situation the fraud will result in lower, artificial
prices bid for the stock. Thus, the effect upon the American securities
market—the quotation of prices that do not reflect the true value of
the stock they represent—will he the same in either situation. In each
instance, the effect is to an interest which the Securities Acts were in-
tended to protect."' Thus, in cases where an effect upon the domes-
tic securities market is asserted, and the security is not listed on a na-
tional exchange, the existence of a domestic market in those securities
should be sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction.
In sum, it appears that the federal courts, in determining
whether subject matter jurisdiction exists over a foreign fraudulent
transaction, have looked first to see whether that transaction had a
detrimental impact upon an interest sought to be protected by the Se-
curities Acts. This interest may be the protection of domestic
investors"" or the protection of the domestic securities market. Hav-
ing identified that interest, the courts will then look to the nature of
the effect upon that interest.
The key distinction in differentiating the types of effect over
which subject matter jurisdiction exists is whether the effect upon
domestic investors is direct or indirect: In Schoenbaum, the foreign
fraud operated directly on a foreign corporation.' 89 Because the
fraud was on the corporation, however, the effect upon American
shareholders was indirect. In this situation, where the effect on the in-
terest of investor protection is indirect, a direct effect must be shown
upon the American securities market. Specifically, the plaintiff must
show that the foreign fraud depressed the prices bid for that security
in the American market.""
This analysis is supported by the court's approach in I IT v. Ven-
cap, Ltd."' There the effect of the foreign fraud was upon a foreign
investment trust—IIT." 2 Thus, the fraud upon the American fund-
holders of HT was "indirect." The court noted this distinctiont 93 and,
postulating a Schoenbaum-type derivative suit by the American fund-
holders of I1T alleging that [IT management had conspired in the
"" 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
'" See id. § 78b{3) (1970).
1 "" This interest is qualified by the requirement that the domestic investor be a
purchaser or seller of the subject securities. See text at notes 176-78 supra.
In " See 405 F.2d at 208.
1 " See irt. Schoenbaum required that the securities he traded on a national ex-
change. Id. The discussion in text at notes 185-188 supra suggests that the trading of
the securities in less formal domestic markets is sufficient for purposes of demonstrat-
ing an effect upon the market.
"I 519 F.2d at 1016-18.
Id. at 1016.
110 Id.
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fraud, emphasized the virtual absence of American fundholders of
HT.'" Had la sought American investment by listing its shares on
an American exchange or selling them in an American market, then it
would appear that subject matter jurisdiction would exist under the
Schoenbaum rationale.
This does not mean, however, that subject matter jurisdiction ex-
ists whenever a corporation whose shares are traded widely in the
United States is defrauded abroad. To lend this broad interpretation
to Schoenbaum would mean that the Securities Acts would apply every
time such a corporation purchased or sold a security abroad.
Schoenbaum should be read in light of the dictum in Leasco which states
that the effect of a foreign fraud upon an American corporate plain-
tiff and its stock will not by itself establish subject matter
jurisdiction. 1 "S It is suggested that the foreign transaction in this situa-
tion should be analyzed in terms of its effect upon the actual security
exchanged. In Schoenbaum-type fact situations, the price of the security
will go down.'" Having identified this detrimental effect upon the se-
curity, the question then becomes whether that security is held widely
enough in America so that it can be said that the depressing effect
upon the security has sufficient impact upon the United States se-
curities market to find that subject matter jurisdiction exists."' Under
Schoenbaum, if the security is listed and traded on a national exchange,
such a depressing effect will be assumed.'" Without such listing and
trading, however, an analysis of the number of American holders of
the security involved in the foreign fraudulent transaction should be
made to determine whether the effect upon the United States se-
curities markets is sufficient to find that subject matter jurisdiction ex-
ists to hear the case.
A different situation is presented where the interest in investor
protection is directly affected. In such cases, the existence of a domes-
tic market in the securities involved in the fraud need not be shown.
Thus, the Second Circuit in Bersch held that reliance by a United
States resident upon a fraudulent statement sent into the United
States from abroad was the type of effect over which federal courts
have subject matter jurisdiction.'" The plaintiff did not have to show
"4 Id. at 1016-17. Approximately 300 of ITTs 150,000 fundholders were Ameri-
can. Id. at 1016.
"8
 468 F.2d at 1334.
"See Schoenbaum,.405 F.2d at 208-09. The court stated that the foreign fraud
will "necessarily" result in lower prices bid for the shares of the same issue as ex-
changed in the fraud. H.
'9T See id.
198 See id. The court stated simply that the foreign fraud had "sufficient" impact
without explicitly indicating how this finding was made.
'" 519 F.2d• at 991. The court in Bersch expressly noted that an "action in the
United States is not necessary when subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on a direct
effect here." Id. However, note that mailing of materials into the United States has been
characterized by a different circuit as conduct within the country rather than the induc-
tion of a domestic effect. Travis v. Aitthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
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that the securities involved in the fraud were traded either on a na-
tional exchange or in the domestic market. 20 °
Judicial emphasis on the direct-indirect effect distinction may be
attributed to a "fairness" policy of applying the Securities Acts to de-
fendants transacting business abroad where they have committed acts
from which may be found a submission to federal jurisdiction under
the Securities Acts, or a necessary effect on interests protected by the
Securities Acts. Thus, in Schoenbaum the court noted that "the Act
seeks to regulate the stock exchanges and the relationships of the in-
vesting public to corporations which invite public investment by listing on
such exchanges." 2" To hold subject to the Act the directors of the
Canadian corporation who chose to list the corporation's shares on an
American exchange was not unfair. They should have foreseen the
effects of their foreign fraud upon American holders of those
shares 2 "2
 and they properly were held to the duty of complying with
the Securities Acts once they sought out American investment by
selling those shares in the United States.
In Bersch, the requirement of a direct effect is analogous to the
Second Circuit's requirement of intent in United States v. Aluminum
Company of America (Alcoa), 2" the leading case in the area of extrater-
ritorial application of the antitrust laws. In Alcoa, one issue presented
was whether subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act ex-
isted over alleged participation by the Canadian affiliates of Alcoa in
an international cartel as a means of protecting its domestic
position.2 " This cartel, formed in Switzerland, elaborately regulated
the means by which aluminum imports would be made to many coun-
tries, including the United States. 205 The court found that subject
matter jurisdiction would exist if the cartel was "intended to affect
imports and did affect them. ,,206
 The court concluded that the re-
quirement of intent was necessary to exclude application of the anti-
trust laws to the many foreign limitations on the supply of goods
abroad which, though not intended to affect imports into the United
States, do have such repercussions. 2 ° 7
 Similarly, in the Securities Act
area, many foreign securities transactions will have an incidental effect
2" The court does not directly state this conclusion. However, in holding that
subject matter jurisdiction can exist solely where there is a mailing of the fraudulent
prospectuses into the United States and a resulting detrimental reliance on them by
domestic purchasers, the court implicitly indicates that for this type of effect, proof of
trading on a national exchange or in an organized domestic market is not necessary. See
519 F.2d at 991.
2
" 1
 405 F.2d at 206 (emphasis supplied).
2"2 Id. at 208. Note that the court in Schoenbaum stated that the foreign fraud
"necessarily" affected American shareholders. Id.
202 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945). The court in Bench found the Alcoa case,
id., analogous. As in Bersch, the effect in Alcoa—the restriction on the free flow of
imports—was a direct one. Compare Bersch, 519 F.2d at 991, with Alcoa, 148 F,2d at 444.
204 148 F.2d at 439-43.
2 " Id. at 442.43:
2" Id. at 444.
207 Id. at 443.
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upon American investors which the parties abroad may not have in-
tended or may even have taken steps to avoid.208 However, without a
stronger nexus to the United States, such as the listing of the se-
curities on a national exchange, 2" subject matter jurisdiction should
not exist over these foreign transactions. In Bersch the sellers of se-
curities to resident Americans certainly must have intended that these
residents rely on the fraudulent prospectus to make their purchase.
Surely they did not intend that the prospectuses be ignored. It is not
unfair for a court which has identified such an intent to extend the
Securities Acts to cover such sales by the defendant.
The court in Bersch also held that a generalized effect upon the
interest either in protection of investors or protection of domestic
markets is insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction.'" This
holding was similarly based on the desire to exclude application of the
Securities Acts to foreign transactions which had only an indirect ef-
fect upon American interests. The court in Schoenbaum had em-
phasized that the general effects of the foreign fraud present in that
case were sufficient to "impair the value of American investments"
and to affect United States commerce, thereby allowing the court to
assume subject matter jurisdiction. 2 " The plaintiffs in Bersch relied on
this approach when they attempted to demonstrate that the lOS offer-
ings resulted in widespread effects on the American securities market
and the American economy in general. 2 t 2 Indeed, the plaintiffs sub-
mitted an affidavit by a Professor of Finance which described a two-
fold effect from the IOS fraud. First, it resulted in a deterioration in
investor confidence in American underwriters at home and abroad.
Second, it caused large scale redemption of shares in the 10S-related
mutual funds, requiring those funds to sell substantial parts of their
portfolios—mainly United States securities—causing a depression in
prices leading ultimately to a steep decline in the purchase of United
States securities by foreigners. 213 Seemingly, these effects were as
great as the impairment of American investments and the impact
upon United States commerce noted by the court in Schoenbaum. 214
However, the court in Bersch stated that such "generalized" effects
upon the American economy or American investors would not confer
subject matter jurisdiction. 213 Rather, the court would only consider
the effects of the foreign fraud upon those "purchasers and sellers of
those securities in whom the United States has an interest;" 216 namely,
202 See, e.g., IIT, 519 F.2d at 1017.
2" See also text at notes 184-86 supra.
R14 Id. at 987-89.
"' Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208-09. The court emphasized the generalized effects
of the foreign fraud upon the American securities market. Id. at 206, 208.
212 519 F.2d at 987-88.
213
 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
2 " See 405 F.2d at 208-09.
316 519 F.2d at 989.
2 " /d.
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purchasers or sellers of the involved securities, or holders of other
securities of the same issue. 217
This approach is consistent with a "fairness" approach to subject
matter jurisdiction under the Securities Acts."' As the district court
in Bersch recognized, it is sometimes difficult to establish a clear corre-
lation between the defendant's acts and the negative impact of these
acts upon the American securities market. 21 " This was not the situa-
tion in Schoenbaum, where the securities involved in the fraud were ac-
tually traded on a national exchange and the correlation could be
presumed. 22° In Schoenbaum-type situations, the domestic effect may
be said to flow necessarily from the foreign fratid. 221 In Bersch, on the
other hand, the chain of causation was far more attenuated. To hold
the defendants responsible for the 'ultimate domestic effect—the
generalized reduction in the prices bid for United States securities
held and then redeemed by the 10S-related mutual funds—would re-
quire a showing that (I) the 105 fraud directly caused a redemption
by the public of lOS-related mutual funds, (2) that the mutual funds
therefore had to sell their holdings in United States securities to meet
the redemption and (3) that these sales caused the price of the se-
curities to decline. This chain of causation falls far short of the intent
required in Alcoa 222 or the forseeability in Schnenbaum. The circuit
court in Bersch was thus arguably correct in not finding subject matter
jurisdiction over foreign transactions which can only be traced
speculatively to the acts of the defendants, and which have at most
only a generalized effect upon American interests.
In Bersch and Schtenbaum, the SeCond Circuit focused mainly on
the qualitative aspects of the detrimental effect upon American in-
terests, ignoring the international law requirement that the effect be
"substantial."223 However, in IIT, the court did indicate that a quan-
sir Id.
21 " See text at notes 201-02 supra.
" 1 " 389 F. Stipp. at 458. The district court was willing to presume the correlation
inasmuch as IOS's subsidiaries held large amounts of American securities which these
subsidiaries would have to redeem to meet the large scale redemptions in their own
funds resulting from the IOS offerings. The district court believed that such a large-
scale redemption of securities would have the natural effect to depress the prices bid
for these securities. Id,
"° See 405 F.2d at 208.
"I See note 202 .stept:a.
222 Note in Alcoa, the effect upon imports into the United States would only be
presumed if the requisite intent to affect imports was demonstrated. 148 F.2d at
444-45.
223 RESTATENIENT (SccoNo orniE FOKEIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 18(b)(ii). See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 991; Schoenbaum,405 F.2d at 208-09. Presumably, a di-
rect effect causing stock losses from fraud, Bersch, 519 F.2d at 991, will not necessitate a
consideration of "substantiality." Where the securities exchanged in the fraud are
traded on a national exchange, it seems that the courts will assume the "substantiality"
of the effect. See Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208-09, where the court said without more
that the effect upon United States investments and commerce was "sufficient" to find
subject matter jurisdiction.
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titative approach based upon the number of American fundholders
and the size of their investments may be appropriate where the fraud
operates directly upon a foreign investment trust, with only an indi-
rect effect upon the American fundholders. 224 The HT court em-
phasized that the "substantiality" of the American effect was very
sma11. 225 However, the court seemed to view substantiality in terms of
the percentage of American ownership in the trust. The court
stressed that the 300 American fundholders of HT constituted only
0.2% of the 150,000 total number of fundholders. Arguably these
Americans held no more than 0.5% of the outstanding funds. 22° By
this analysis the court may have been suggesting that at some point
the effect on American fundholders would be substantial enough, in
terms of the percentage of American ownership, to establish subject
matter jurisdiction. 227 When this point would be reached was not
made clear. Moreover, the absence of any such indication may indi-
cate that the court's mathematical analysis was for illustrative purposes
and no more.
An alternative interpretation of the court's approach in HT to
the substantiality question is that the court examined the percentage
of American ownership for the purpose of determining whether the
foreign business entity could be considered American, even though
technically foreign. 228 At the appropriate level of American owner-
ship, the corporation might be treated as the hypothetical American
corporate plaintiff in Leasco 229 or as the non-resident American pur-
chasers in Bersch. 2" Realistically, the required percentage of American
ownership would have to be quite high in order not to unduly prej-
udice defendants transacting abroad who may have no idea that they
are dealing with an "American" corporation.
Despite their uncertainties, Bersch and HT contribute significant
guidelines to aid in the analysis of effects-based jurisdiction. Bench is
224 519 F.2d at 1016-17:Note that the American effect was "indirect." See text at
notes 191-194 supra.
It is somewhat unclear whether the court in IIT considered the discussion of the
percentage of American ownership relevant only if IIT fundholders brought the action
derivatively on a Schorabaum-type theory. See 519 F.2d at 1017. This discussion will as-
sume that it did not. The percentage of American ownership in the derivative action
situation would be relevant to prove the existence of a domestic market in the securities
involved in the fraud. See text at notes 196-98 supra.
226 519 F.2d at 1017.
"6 Id.
2" See also Selzer v. Bank of Bermuda, 385 F. Supp. 415, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
where the court found a domestic effect upon the American beneficiary of a foreign
trust. In Selzer, however, the American was the sole beneficiary; thus, the percentage of
American ownership was 100%. Id.
226 See note 227 supra.
222 468 F.2d at 1334. See text at note 195 supra. The Leasco court postulated a
situation where an American business was defrauded abroad. 468 F.2d at 1334.
"2 519 F.2d at 992-93. Under this view, IIT would assert its claim as an Ameri-
can transacting business abroad. Here the effect would be direct and IIT would only
have to show that "preparatory" activities took place in the United States. See id.
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an expansive decision which directs emphasis away from the strict re-
quirement of Schoenbaum that the transactions involve stock registered
and listed on a national exchange. Under Bersch, courts will focus on
whether the defendants may be said to have submitted to United
States jurisdiction either by selling the corporation's shares in the
United States or by fraudulently trading in securities held widely in
the United States. Subjecting the defendants to liability under the Se-
curities Acts in these instances is justified, on the ground that the de-
fendants can be said to have foreseen, if not intended, a detrimental
effect upon protected American interests. IIT, on the other hand, is a
contractive decision. Under //T, foreign corporations transacting
business outside the United States cannot expect the protection of the
Securities Acts merely because a small percentage of its shareholders
are American.
CONCLUSION
The recent increase in the number of transnational security
transactions has brought with it a concomitant increase in attempts to
apply the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts to securities
transactions involving foreign elements. The courts have had diffi-
culty handling the jurisdictional prOblems that have resulted. The
Bersch and LIT decisions are the first to attempt to provide a com-
prehensive set of guidelines for analyzing these issues. The courts
were moderately successful in defining the relevant factors involved in
determining jurisdiction; however, many unclear areas remain. The
crucial line between substantial and preparatory activities is as yet only
vaguely defined, as is the type of effect in the United States that, by
itself, would be sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. The
approach that the federal courts have chosen to take on the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction involves such subtle balancing that the law
will have to develop on a case-by-case basis, with broad outlines being
provided only in sweeping decisions such as Bersch and IIT. A com-
plete set of guidelines in this area, however, can only result from
amendments to section 27 of the Securities Act of 1934 made in light
of considerations of international relations.
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